The beginning of a radical fracture. Stalingrad battle. A turning point in the course of the war. Victory over fascism

Repeat questions 1. 2. 3. 4. What conclusions were drawn by Stalin after the victory near Moscow? What is the content of the Stavka order No. 130? What strategic miscalculation was made by the Headquarters in determining the main blow of the fascist troops in the summer of 1942? Name two major battles in May-July 1942 in which Soviet troops suffered heavy losses.

Review questions 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. What is the main content of the Headquarters Order No. 227? What is a "guard squad"? What is "occupied territory"? What is Plan Ost? What order was established in the occupied territories? Why did the Nazis set up concentration camps?

Repeat questions 11. 12. 13. 14. Who is General Vlasov? What army did he command? In what territories was the partisan movement formed? What is the name of the head of the Headquarters of the partisan movement. Name the largest partisan operations.

Assignments to paragraph 31, paragraph 1 Page. 225 - how did the mood of the Soviet people change in the first years of the war? n Page Document 226 - How did Stalin assess the outbreak of the war? What was unusual about his conversion? n

A radical turning point is the transfer of the strategic initiative to the Soviet troops, the creation of prerequisites for a transition to a counteroffensive.

The ratio of the economic potentials of Germany and the USSR By the beginning of 1941, Germany surpassed the USSR by 1.5 times; n Until the autumn of 1941 - the occupation of Soviet territory: where 42% of the population lived, more than 40% of electricity was produced, 35% of industrial. production, smelted 70% of iron, 60% of steel, 63% of coal was mined. n By the fall of 1941, Germany outnumbered the USSR by 3-4 times. n

Directions for restructuring the economy on a war footing 1. 2. 3. Evacuation of enterprises, people and valuables from the front-line zone to the east (by the end of 1941, 2.5 thousand enterprises and 12 million people were moved to the east) In Krasnoyarsk - a combine plant. The transition of civil sector enterprises to the production of military products (GAZ + Krasnoye Sormovo = T 34 tanks). Accelerated construction of new facilities that replaced those lost in the first months of the war.

The results of the restructuring of the economy By the end of 1941, it was possible to stop the decline in industrial production caused by the loss of territories and the bombing. n By mid-1942, to ensure a steady increase in military production. n The output of military products in terms of volume exceeded the level of Germany. n

Education and science during the war years (p. 228) 1. 2. 3. 4. In what regions of the country was schooling interrupted? To which regions of the country were the main scientific centers moved? What are the scientific centers created during the war years? Name the scientists who worked in the field of aerodynamics?

Cultural figures - to the front (p. 228) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Name the works of Soviet poets who sang the courage of the inhabitants of besieged Leningrad. Name the author of the poem "Vasily Terkin" What is a "front theater"? To which region were the country's film studios evacuated? Name the popular songwriters during the war years.

Homework for 8.05 Paragraph 31, get ready for work. n Section 32 point 1, 2, 3 n

On August 23, 1942, at 16:18, a massive bombardment of Stalingrad began with the forces of the German 4th Air Fleet. During the day, 2,000 sorties were made. The city was destroyed by 90%, more than 40 thousand civilians died that day.

Correlation of forces Forces and means Red Army Germany and its allies Personnel (thousand people) 1134.8 1011.5 Number of tanks 1560 675 Number of guns and mortars 14934 10290 Number of aircraft 1916 1219

Counteroffensive near Stalingrad - operation "Uranus" Operation "Uranus" - the code name of the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation of the Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War (November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943). The counteroffensive of the troops of three fronts: the South-Western (gen. N. F. Vatutin), Stalingrad (gen. A. I. Eremenko) and Don (gen. K. K. Rokossovsky), with the aim of encircling and destroying the enemy group of troops in the area city ​​of Stalingrad.

21st, 5th Tank, 1st Guards, 17th and 2nd Air Armies Vatutin Nikolay Fedorovich 62nd, 64th, 57th, 8th Air, 51st Armies Eremenko Andrey Ivanovich 65th, 24th, 66th armies, 16th air army Rokossovsky Konstantinovich

Stalingrad was defended by the armies: 64th under the command of M.S. Shumilov 62nd under the command of V.I. Soviet Union

8th Italian Army 2nd Hungarian Army Army Group "Don" (commander - E. Manstein). It included the 6th Army, the 3rd Romanian Army, the Goth Army Group, the Hollidt Task Force. 3rd Romanian Army 4th Romanian Army Two Finnish volunteer units 6th Army - Commander General of Tank Forces Friedrich Paulus Army Group "B" (commander - M. Weichs). 2nd Army - Commanding General of Infantry Hans von Salmuth, Friedrich Paulus E. Manstein

November 19, 1942 On November 20, 1942, the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops began on November 19, 1942 after powerful artillery preparation by strikes from Yugo's army formations. Western and Don fronts. On November 20, the offensive began and the troops of the Stalingrad Front

Front line by the end of November Front line by the end of 1942 p. you ate 330. h

MAMAEV KURGAN n The battle on Mamaev Kurgan was of great strategic importance: from its top, the adjacent territory and the crossings across the Volga were clearly visible and shot through. n The Nazis stormed it 10-12 times a day, but, losing people and equipment, they could not capture the entire territory of the mound.

The battles for Mamaev Kurgan lasted 135 days In the area of ​​Mamaev Kurgan in February 1943, the Battle of Stalingrad ended.

The mass heroism of our compatriots was shown in the Battle of Stalingrad. More than 300 Nazis were destroyed by Vasily Grigoryevich Zaitsev in street battles. Many fighters taught sniper art. Many times he had to engage in single combat with the Nazi snipers, and each time he emerged victorious. But Zaitsev was especially famous for the sniper duel with the head of the Berlin school of snipers, Major Koenings, who was sent to Stalingrad with a special task to intensify the sniper movement in the German troops. For well-aimed fire in Stalingrad, Vasily Zaitsev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. VASILY ZAITSEV

SIGNALER MATVEY PUTILOV When communication stopped on Mamaev Kurgan at the most intense moment of the battle, an ordinary signalman of the 308th Infantry Division Matvey Putilov went to eliminate the wire break. When restoring a damaged communication line, both hands were crushed by fragments of a mine. Losing consciousness, he tightly clamped the ends of the wire between his teeth. Communication has been restored. For this feat, Matvey was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War. His communications reel was handed over to the best signalmen of the 308th division.

Pavlov's House - a symbol of courage and heroism of the defenders of Stalingrad n n 4-storey building in the center of Stalingrad, the defense of which was headed by Sergeant Pavlov. From September 23 to November 25, the Nazis launched attacks several times a day. German losses during the assault exceeded their losses during the capture of Paris.

Results of the operation During the Stalingrad offensive operation, two German armies were destroyed, two Romanian and one Italian armies were defeated. 32 divisions and 3 brigades destroyed. The enemy lost more than 800 thousand people. The losses of the Soviet troops amounted to 485 thousand people. “Before the Battle of Stalingrad, history did not know a battle when such a large group of troops would have been surrounded and completely defeated. The defeat of the enemy on the Volga marked the beginning of a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War as a whole, the expulsion of enemy troops from Soviet territory began. "- G.K. Zhukov.

On February 4, 1943, a rally of thousands of defenders and residents of Stalingrad took place in the wounded, mutilated beyond recognition city. After liberation, the city was in complete ruins. The scale of the destruction was so great that it was suggested that the city be rebuilt elsewhere, and the ruins left as a reminder to posterity of the horrors of war. Nevertheless, it was decided to rebuild the city almost anew. There were no dwellings, transport did not work, factories were destroyed, the land was crammed with unexploded mines, bombs and shells (which are found to this day). But the whole vast country came to the aid of the heroic city. Stalingrad was revived.

Eternal flame

Ministry of General Education of the Russian Federation

Yaroslav the Wise Novgorod State University

Humanitarian Institute

Department of History of Russia

ROAD REVERSE IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR. 1942-1943

Completed:

4th year student of OZO

Faculty of History

Bogun Yu.V.

Checked:

"____" ______________ 2000

Velikiy Novgorod

Strategic situation in autumn 1942.… 2

Encirclement of Nazi troops near Stalingrad 3

Battle of Kursk.… 12

Forcing the Dnieper.… 20

Conclusion.… 25

The situation on the fronts of the world war was determined by the results of the armed struggle that unfolded in the summer and autumn of 1942, the military-political goals of the belligerent states, their capabilities in building up forces and means, as well as the specific features of each theater of military operations.

Hostilities reached their greatest scope and intensity on the Soviet-German front, where in the summer more than 700 calculated divisions (up to 12 million people), about 130 thousand guns and mortars, many thousands of tanks and aircraft took part in the armed struggle on both sides. By autumn, the length of the Soviet-German front had reached almost 6200 km - the maximum value for the entire war.

As a result of the heroic resistance of the Soviet troops, the enemy offensive on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front was stopped. The offensive capabilities of the strike groupings of enemy troops have dried up. The strategic plan of the fascist German command for the summer of 1942 failed. On October 14, 1942, the Wehrmacht High Command was forced to issue Operational Order No. 1 on a temporary transition to strategic defense. However, in Stalingrad, as well as in the areas of Nalchik and Tuapse, active hostilities continued.

Despite the fact that in most areas the enemy offensive was stopped, the situation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front remained difficult. The most important water artery of the country - the Volga, the last communication that directly connected the central regions with Transcaucasia, was under the blows of the enemy. The threat of a breakthrough by the Nazi troops through the passes of the Main Caucasian Range on the coast of the Caucasus to the last bases of the Black Sea Fleet and to the most important oil-bearing region of the country, Baku, was not removed.

“Never before on the Soviet-German front were there so many enemy formations as by November 1942 - 266 divisions, of which 193.5 German, 18 Finnish, 26 Romanian, 11.5 Italian, 14 Hungarian, 2 Slovak and 1 Spanish . The enemy ground forces were supported by large aviation forces. Significant fleet forces also acted against the Soviet Union. At the end of 1942, the main forces of the German surface fleet, submarines and up to 300 aircraft were involved in the fight on the northern communications. In the Baltic and Black Seas there were mainly light forces of the enemy fleet.

More than 80 percent of the main enemy forces were concentrated in Army Groups North, Center and B on the front from the Gulf of Finland to Stalingrad. On the northern sector of the Soviet-German front from the Barents Sea to the Gulf of Finland, the 20th German Army and Finnish troops operated, in the North Caucasus - Army Group A.

The main forces of the Soviet Army were also concentrated between the Gulf of Finland and Astrakhan. Ten fronts unfolded here:

Leningradsky, Volkhovsky, Severo-Zapadny - in the north-west direction; Kalininsky, Western and Moscow defense zones - in the western direction;

Bryansk, Voronezh, the newly formed South-Western, Donskoy, Stalingrad - in the south-western direction. The Karelian Front and the 7th Separate Army operated on the northern flank of the strategic front, and the Transcaucasian Front on the southern flank.”

The active army had 390 rifle and cavalry divisions, 254 rifle, separate tank and mechanized brigades, 30 fortified areas, 17 tank and mechanized corps. Preparing for major operations, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command also formed strategic reserves.

Significant assistance to the Soviet troops was provided by the nationwide struggle behind enemy lines. The number of partisan forces alone reached more than 125 thousand people. They disrupted enemy communications and conducted reconnaissance in the interests of the army in the field.

The Northern, Red Banner Baltic and Black Sea fleets included 2 battleships, 6 cruisers, 4 leaders, 27 destroyers and destroyers, 87 submarines, 757 combat aircraft. In the autumn of 1942, the fleets operated in difficult conditions. The Red Banner Baltic Fleet could only use bases in Kronstadt and Leningrad, and the Black Sea Fleet on the coast of the Caucasus. The fleets performed the tasks of protecting their communications and disrupting the enemy's maritime traffic, attacking its ports and coastal facilities, and assisting ground forces in coastal areas. Important tasks were also carried out by the Ladoga, Volga and Caspian military flotillas.

In terms of the scale and results of the armed struggle, the Soviet-German front, by the beginning of a new stage of the war, remained the main front of the Second World War. It was here that the striking forces of the fascist bloc were subjected to exhaustion. Of all the losses suffered by the German armed forces in the second half of 1942, 96 percent were losses on the eastern front. .

Since November 1942, i.e. from the beginning of the victorious offensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad, the second period of the Great Patriotic War (November 1942-December 1943) began, which went down in history as a period of a radical turning point in the course of the war.

For two hundred days and nights, fierce battles and battles of the Battle of Stalingrad did not subside on a vast territory between the Volga and Don rivers. This great battle in scope, intensity and consequences was unparalleled in history. It was a major milestone on the path of the Soviet people to victory.

In the course of a defensive battle, the Soviet troops repulsed the enemy's onslaught, exhausted and bled his strike groupings, and then, in a counteroffensive brilliant in design and execution, completely defeated the main one.

The strategic offensive operation of the Soviet Armed Forces to encircle and defeat the fascist troops near Stalingrad lasted from November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943. According to the nature of the operational-strategic tasks, the operation can be divided into three major stages: breaking through the defense, defeating the enemy’s flank groupings and encirclement of the 6th and part of the forces of the 4th Panzer German armies; disruption of the enemy's attempts to release the encircled grouping and the development of the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops on the outer front of the encirclement; completion of the defeat of the encircled Nazi troops.

By the beginning of the counteroffensive, the troops of the opposing sides in the Stalingrad direction occupied the following position.

In the 250-kilometer strip from Upper Mamon to Kletskaya, the South-Western Front was deployed. To the southeast, from Kletskaya to Yerzovka, the Don Front operated in a 150-kilometer zone. From the northern outskirts of Stalingrad to Astrakhan, in a strip up to 450 km wide, were the troops of the Stalingrad Front.

“The fascist German Army Group B, on whose right wing the main blow of the Soviet troops was to fall, defended a front with a length of about 1400 km. Its left-flank German 2nd Army, located northwest of Voronezh, covered the Kursk direction. The 2nd Hungarian Army, adjacent to it, operated on the right bank of the Don in the Kharkov direction. Further along the Don, from Novaya Kalitva to Veshenskaya, in the Voroshilovgrad direction, the 8th Italian army was located, east, from Veshenskaya to Kletskaya, the 3rd Romanian army was on the defensive. In the area immediately adjacent to Stalingrad, the unsuccessful offensive battles of the formations of the 6th German, and south of the city to Krasnoarmeysk, of the 4th German tank armies persistently continued. The troops of the 4th Romanian Army, which was under operational control of the 4th German Tank Army, defended themselves from Krasnoarmeysk and further south. On the extreme right wing of the army group to the Manych River, where the dividing line between Army Groups “B” and “A” passed, the 16th motorized division of the 4th German tank army fought on a wide front.

The fascist German troops were supported by aviation of the Don Air Force Command and part of the forces of the 4th Air Fleet. In total, the enemy had more than 1200 aircraft in this direction. The main efforts of enemy aviation were directed to strike at Soviet troops in Stalingrad. And crossing the Volga and the Don.

There were eight divisions in the reserve of Army Group B, including three tank divisions (of which one was Romanian). The activity of Soviet troops in other sectors of the front did not allow the enemy to transfer forces and equipment to Stalingrad.

In the course of fierce defensive battles, the fronts of the Stalingrad direction were significantly weakened. Therefore, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, in preparing the operation, paid special attention to strengthening them. The strategic reserves that arrived at these fronts made it possible to change the balance of forces and means in favor of the Soviet troops by the start of the counteroffensive. Soviet troops significantly outnumbered the enemy in artillery and especially in tanks. The Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts, which were assigned a decisive role in the operation, had the greatest superiority in tanks.

The Soviet command also managed to achieve a slight advantage over the enemy in aircraft. Based on the general strategic plan of the counteroffensive, the direct preparation of which in the fronts began in the first half of October 1942, the front commanders decided to conduct front-line operations.

“The strike force of the Southwestern Front, consisting of the 5th Panzer Army of General P.L. Romanenko and the 21st Army of General I.M. Chistyakov, was to go on the offensive from the bridgeheads in the areas of Serafimovich and Kletskaya. She had to break through the enemy's defenses, defeat the 3rd Romanian army and, developing a swift offensive in the general direction of Kalach, on the third day of the operation, connect with the troops of the Stalingrad Front. At the same time, it was envisaged by the forces of the 1st Guards Army - Commander General D. D. Lelyushenko - to strike in a south-western direction, reach the line of the Krivaya and Chir rivers and create an actively operating external encirclement front here. Cover and air support for the troops were assigned to the 17th Air Army under the command of General S. A. Krasovsky. The formations of the 2nd Air Army were also involved - commander General K. N. Smirnov.

By decision of the front commander, the main blow was delivered by the 64th, 57th and 51st armies, commanded by Generals M.S. Shumilov, F.I. Tolbukhin and N.I. Trufanov. The shock grouping of the front received the task of going on the offensive from the area of ​​​​the Sarpinsky Lakes, defeating the 6th Romanian Army Corps and, developing the offensive to the north-west, in the direction of Sovetsky, Kalach, to link up with the troops of the Southwestern Front here. Part of the forces of the front was to advance in the direction of Abganerovo, Kotelnikovsky and create an external encirclement front at this line. The efforts of the 8th Air Army of the Front, Commander General T. T. Khryukin, were supposed to be concentrated on covering and supporting the front’s shock group.”

The Don Front struck from the bridgehead in the Kletskaya area with the forces of the 65th Army of General P.I. Batov and from the Kachalinskaya area with the forces of the 24th Army of General I.V. Galanin.

Long-range aviation was planned to be used in the zone of the South-Western Front. Covering the troops in Stalingrad was assigned to the 102nd Air Defense Fighter Aviation Division.

The commanders of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts, in accordance with the plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, provided for the creation of an encirclement simultaneously with the internal and external front, the total length of which could be 300-350 km ..

In accordance with the decisions of the commanders of the fronts, groupings of forces and means were created, and offensive missions were assigned to the armies. The armies operating in the directions of the main attacks of the fronts (5th Panzer, 21st and 51st) had the greatest depth of operation. For them, a high rate of advance of mobile formations was planned, which was to play a decisive role in completing the encirclement of the enemy grouping.

The direct defense of the city was carried out by the 62nd and 64th armies. The 63rd, 4th Tank, 1st Guards, 24th and 66th armies, operating northwest of Stalingrad, continued to play a major role during the battle, and the 57th and 51st armies operating south of the city. September 13 the enemy struck at the junction of the 62nd and 64th armies, captured the village of Kuporosnoye and went to the Volga. The flanks of both armies were divided, but the enemy failed to develop further success. The troops of the 64th Army took up defensive positions at the line of the southern outskirts of Kuporosnaya, Kuporosnaya Balka, Ivanovka. On August 29, the 62nd Army was transferred to the South-Eastern Front. The troops of this army, which since September 12 was commanded by Lieutenant General V.I. Chuikov, defended the central and northern parts of the city. Isolated from the north from the troops of the Stalingrad Front, and from the south from the main forces of the Southeastern Front, the 62nd Army was significantly inferior to the enemy opposing it both in terms of personnel and weapons.

Having begun the assault on Stalingrad on September 13, the enemy directed his main efforts until September 26 to capture its central and southern parts. The fighting was extremely fierce. A particularly stubborn struggle was waged in the area of ​​Mamaev Kurgan, on the banks of the Tsaritsa, in the area of ​​the elevator, around the stations Stalingrad-1, Stalingrad-2, on the western outskirts of Elshanka.

During two nights, September 15 and 16, the 13th Guards Rifle Division of General A.I. Rodimtsev crossed to the right bank of the Volga, arriving to replenish the bloodless 62nd Army. The guard units pushed back the German troops from the area of ​​the central crossing across the Volga, cleared many streets and quarters of them, and drove them out of the Stalingrad-1 station. On September 16, the troops of the 62nd Army, with the support of aviation, stormed the Mamaev Kurgan.

On September 16 and 17, especially intense fighting took place in the city center. The 92nd Naval Rifle Brigade, formed from the sailors of the Baltic and Northern Fleets, and the 137th Tank Brigade, armed with light tanks, arrived to the aid of the bleeding 62nd Army.

The 64th Army, which continued to hold the lines it occupied, diverted part of the enemy's forces to itself. On September 21 and 22, the enemy's forward detachments broke through to the Volga in the area of ​​the central crossing. The Germans captured most of the city.

Reinforcements continued to arrive to help the defenders of Stalingrad. On the night of September 23, the 284th Rifle Division under the command of Colonel N.F. crossed over to the right bank. Batyuk.

In the city, on the streets and squares of which fierce battles unfolded, there was still a part of the inhabitants. The operational groups of the city defense committee, which remained in the city, directed the activities of the surviving enterprises. Workers repaired damaged tanks, made weapons, shells, anti-tank weapons. Many residents of the city with weapons in their hands fought against the enemy.

From the end of September, the main efforts of the enemy were directed towards capturing the northern part of the city, where the largest industrial enterprises were located. Stubborn fighting also took place in the Mamaev Kurgan area and on the extreme right flank of the 62nd Army in the Orlovka area. Street fighting took place on the territory of the workers' settlements "Red October" and "Barrikada".

The main forces of the Stalingrad Front were cut off by the enemy from the city. With this in mind, at the end of September, the Headquarters renamed the Stalingrad Front into the Don Front. Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky was appointed commander of the Don Front. The South-Eastern Front, whose troops were fighting for the city, was renamed the Stalingrad Front (commanded by Colonel General A.I. Eremenko). Later, on the right wing of the Don Front, a new, Southwestern Front was created (commanded by Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin).

The command of the Stalingrad Front sought to weaken the onslaught of the Nazi troops directly on the city. To this end, private operations were carried out south of Stalingrad. September 29 - October 4, the troops of the 51st Army launched a counterattack in the Sadovoe area. Around the same time, a second counterattack was delivered by the 57th and 51st armies in the area of ​​lakes Sarpa, Tsatsa and Barmantsak. These counterattacks forced the German command to withdraw part of its forces from the main direction, which temporarily weakened the enemy's onslaught directly on the city. In addition, as a result of these actions, the Soviet troops seized advantageous bridgeheads for the subsequent counteroffensive.

In the first days of October, the 62nd Army defended itself along a front 25 km long and 200 m to 2.5 km deep. By this time, the enemy had completely occupied the territory of the city south of the Tsaritsa River to Kuporosny and reached the top of the Mamaev Kurgan, which allowed him to view and shoot through the positions held by the 62nd Army, as well as the crossings across the Volga.

The southern part of Stalingrad (Kirov district) was steadfastly defended by the 64th Army under the command of General M.S. Shumilov.

In the northern part of Stalingrad, the enemy, at the cost of incredible efforts and huge losses, took possession of the Orlovka area, deepened into the territory of industrial settlements. The Nazis owned the territory of the central and northern parts of the city: Yermansky, Dzerzhinsky, a significant part of Krasnooktyabrsky, Barrikadny and Traktorozavodsky districts. From the first days of October, battles began for the Krasny Oktyabr, Barrikada and Tractor factories, located north of Mamaev Kurgan.

From the end of September, the entire vast territory of the tractor plant was engulfed in fires. Hundreds of German planes bombarded him with air strikes. The enemy sought to break through to the tractor factory and take possession of it. The approaches to it were defended by a group of Colonel S.F. Gorokhov, as well as the 112th and 308th rifle divisions of colonels I.E. Ermolkin and L.N. Gurtiev. On the night of October 4, they were joined by the 37th Guards Rifle Division of General V.G. Zheludeva. Armed detachments of workers also fought for their enterprises.

A stubborn struggle was also going on for the Krasny Oktyabr and Barrikada factories. October 14 was the day of the most difficult trials for the defenders of Stalingrad. After powerful aviation and artillery preparation, the Nazis rushed to the tractor plant and the Barrikady plant. Several German divisions advanced on a section of about 5 km.

The troops of the 37th Guards, 95th, 308th and 112th Rifle Divisions, exhausted in fierce battles, fought for every house, floor, and landing. After a four-hour battle, the Germans broke into the territory of the tractor factory, and then went to the Volga. The right flank of the 62nd Army was cut off from the main forces north of the Mokraya Mechetka River, the northern group of the 62nd Army under the command of Colonel S.F. Gorokhova, engulfed by the Nazis from three sides and pressed against the Volga, staunchly defended.

On the territory of the tractor plant, fierce battles continued until October 18. Most of the soldiers and officers of the 37th Guards Rifle Division, which bore the brunt of the struggle, died heroically defending the plant. The remnants of the 37th Guards and 95th Rifle Divisions were withdrawn to the outskirts of the Barrikady plant, where they continued to fight. Crossed to the right bank of the Volga, the 138th Infantry Division of Colonel I.I. Lyudnikova joined the struggle for the village and the Barrikady plant.

The defenders of Stalingrad adamantly held the city. In the hands of the enemy were Mamaev Kurgan, exits to the Volga in the area of ​​​​the tractor plant and the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe mouth of the Tsaritsa. The territory occupied by the 62nd Army was shot through by enemy artillery and mortars, and in some places by machine-gun and automatic fire. All city buildings that were held by Soviet soldiers were destroyed by German aircraft. The rest of them perished in the fire.

After the Nazis reached the Volga, Stalingrad retained railway communications only on the eastern bank of the river. German aviation, with their raids on railway lines and stations, disrupted military transportation. Therefore, cargo and troops sent to Stalingrad from the rear of the country were unloaded from trains 250-300 km from the front. Then they were transferred to the crossings across the Volga along dirt roads.

In an attempt to isolate the Soviet troops from the rear, the enemy fired artillery and mortar fire at the crossings. However, the connection between Stalingrad and the eastern shore was provided by engineering troops, a civilian river fleet and ships of the Volga military flotilla. They transported troops, weapons, ammunition, food to the right bank, and wounded soldiers and civilians were evacuated from Stalingrad to the left bank. Interacting with the troops defending Stalingrad, the military flotilla supported them with artillery fire from their ships, and landed landing groups.

In the difficult situation of street fighting, the defenders of Stalingrad showed great courage and steadfastness. The officers and generals leading the fight were directly in the battle zone. This allowed, for example, the command of the 62nd Army - General V.I. Chuikov, a member of the military council of the army K.A. Gurov, Chief of Staff of the Army N.I. Krylov and their associates - to ensure continuity of command and communication with the troops. The command posts of the divisions of this army were located 200-300 meters from the front line.

The struggle in Stalingrad was carried on day and night with extreme bitterness. The defense of the 62nd Army was divided into three main centers of struggle:

Rynok and Spartanovka district, where the group of Colonel S.F. Gorokhov; the eastern part of the Barrikady plant, which was held by the soldiers of the 138th division; then, after a gap of 400 - 600m, the main front of the 62nd Army went - from the "Red October" to the pier. The left flank in this area was occupied by the 13th Guards Division, whose positions were close to the banks of the Volga. The southern part of the city continued to be defended by units of the 64th Army.

The German troops of the 6th Army of Paulus were never able to capture the entire territory of Stalingrad. A striking example of the stamina of its defenders was the heroic defense of Pavlov's House.

In early November, ice appeared on the Volga. Communication with the right bank was broken, the Soviet soldiers ran out of ammunition, food, and medicines. However, the legendary city on the Volga remained undefeated.

The idea of ​​an offensive operation in the area of ​​Stalingrad was discussed at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command already in the first half of September. “At this time, writes Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, we were finishing the formation and training of strategic reserves, which largely consisted of tank and mechanized units and formations, armed for the most part with medium and heavy tanks; stockpiles of other military equipment and ammunition were created. All this allowed Headquarters already in September 1942. draw a conclusion about the possibility and expediency of delivering a decisive blow to the enemy in the near future ...

When discussing these issues at Headquarters, in which General G.K. Zhukov and I, it was determined that the planned counter-offensive should include two main operational tasks: one - to encircle and isolate the main grouping of German troops operating directly in the city area, and the other - to destroy this grouping. The counteroffensive plan, which received the code name "Uranus", was notable for its purposefulness and boldness of design. The offensive of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts was to unfold on an area of ​​​​400 square meters. km. Troops making the main maneuver to encircle the enemy grouping had to fight a distance of up to 120-140 km from the north and up to 100 km from the south. It was envisaged to create two fronts to encircle the enemy - internal and external.

When choosing decisive strikes, it was taken into account that the main enemy grouping was located in the Stalingrad region, and its flanks on the middle reaches of the Don and south of Stalingrad were covered mainly by Romanian and Italian troops, which had relatively low equipment and combat capability. Many Italian, Romanian and Hungarian soldiers and officers at that time asked themselves the question: why are they dying in the snows of Russia, far from their homeland?

In the first half of November, large forces of Soviet troops were drawn up to Stalingrad, and huge flows of military cargo were transferred. The concentration of formations and their regrouping inside the fronts were carried out only at night and were carefully camouflaged.

The command of the Wehrmacht did not expect the counteroffensive of the Red Army near Stalingrad. This misconception was supported by erroneous forecasts by German intelligence. According to some signs, the Nazis nevertheless began to guess about the impending Soviet offensive in the south, but they did not know the main thing: the scale and time of the offensive, the composition of the strike groups and the direction of their strikes.

On the directions of the main attacks, the Soviet command created a double and triple superiority of forces. The decisive role was assigned to four tank and two mechanized corps.

November 19, 1942 The Red Army launched a counteroffensive near Stalingrad. The troops of the Southwestern and right wing of the Don Fronts broke through the defenses of the 3rd Romanian Army in several sectors. Developing the offensive in the southeast direction, mobile formations advanced 35-40 km in the first two days, repelling all enemy counterattacks. Rifle formations also solved the assigned tasks. On November 20, the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. Its strike groups broke through the defenses of the 4th Panzer Army of the Germans and the 4th Romanian Army, and mobile formations rushed into the gaps formed - the 13th and 4th mechanized and 4th cavalry corps.

The command post of the 6th German army was under the threat of attack by the advancing Soviet troops, and Pauls was forced to hastily transfer it from Glubinskoye to Nizhne-Chirskaya. The enemy was in a panic.

At dawn on November 22, in the offensive zone of the Southwestern Front, the advance detachment of the 26th Tank Corps, led by Lieutenant Colonel G.N. left bank of the river.

On November 23, the mobile troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad Fronts closed the encirclement around the 6th and part of the forces of the 4th Panzer German armies. 22 divisions numbering about 330 thousand. people were surrounded. In addition, during the offensive, large forces of the Romanian troops were defeated.

During the period from November 24 to mid-December, in the course of stubborn battles, a continuous internal encirclement front arose around the enemy grouping. Active hostilities were also conducted on the huge external front, which was created during the offensive operation.

Attempts to eliminate the encircled group on the move did not bring the expected results. It turned out that a serious miscalculation had been made in assessing its strength. Initially, it was believed that under the command of Paulus is 85-90 thousand. people, and in fact there were over 300 thousand. Therefore, the elimination of the encircled enemy required careful preparation.

The main command of the Wehrmacht was preparing to release the troops surrounded in the Stalingrad region. To solve this problem, the enemy created the Don army group. It included all the troops located south of the middle reaches of the Don to the Astrakhan steppes, and the encircled Paulus group. The commander was appointed General Field Marshal Manstein. Troops from the Caucasus, near Voronezh, Orel, as well as from France, Poland and Germany, were hastily transferred to reinforce the Don Army Group. In front of the troops of the Southwestern Front there were 17 divisions from the Don Army Group, and 13 divisions under the command of General Goth opposed the troops of the 5th shock and 51st armies of the Stalingrad Front. The enemy command gave the order to carry out the operation "Winter Thunderstorm".

On the morning of December 12, the German troops of the Goth group went on the offensive from the Kotelnikov area, delivering the main blow along the Tikhoretsk-Stalingrad railway. the troops of the 51st Army of the Stalingrad Front opposing the enemy here had significantly less forces and means. The Nazis, having a particularly large superiority in the number of tanks and aircraft, broke through the Soviet defenses and by the evening of the first day they reached the southern bank of the Aksai River. For several days, units of the 51st Army under the command of Major General N.I. Trufanov fought fierce battles, holding back the onslaught of the enemy on the northern bank of the Aksai River. Taking advantage of the superiority of forces, the Germans crossed this river and began to move towards the next frontier - the Myshkova River.

A fierce tank battle unfolded between the Aksai and Myshkova rivers. A particularly stubborn struggle went on for the Verkhne-Kumsky farm.

The Kotelnikovskaya grouping of the enemy, having suffered huge losses, nevertheless broke through to the Myshkova River. Only 35-40 km remained to the encircled grouping of Paulus. However, the plans of the enemy were never realized.

The formations of the 2nd Guards Army were already approaching the line of the Myshkov River, which delayed the further advance of the Kotelnikov group. On the morning of December 24, the 2nd Guards and 51st Armies went on the offensive. Breaking the resistance of the enemy, the Soviet troops successfully advanced and on December 29 cleared the city and the Kotelnikovo railway station from the Nazi troops. The army group "Goth" was defeated.

The German command was powerless to restore the front on the Volga. Moreover, during the December operations on the middle Don and in the Kotelnikovo area, the enemy suffered huge losses. Manstein's troops, having been defeated, retreated to the south, beyond Manych.

By the beginning of January 1943. The Stalingrad Front was transformed into the Southern Front. His troops and the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front carried out offensive operations against the Nazi Group "A". The aggressive plans of the Nazi Reich failed on the entire southern wing of the Soviet-German front.

By the end of December 1942. the outer front moved 200-250 km away from the group surrounded by Stalingrad. The ring of Soviet troops directly covering the enemy constituted the internal front. The territory occupied by the enemy was 1400 sq. km.

The enemy, relying on a strong and deep defense, stubbornly resisted. The presence of airfields in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe “boiler” allowed him to receive aircraft. However, the doom of the encircled group every day became more and more obvious. The High Command of the Wehrmacht, despite the hopelessness of the resistance of the encircled group, continued to demand a fight "to the last soldier."

The Soviet Supreme High Command decided that the time had come for a final blow. For this purpose, a plan of operation was developed, which received the conditional name "Ring". Operation "Ring" was entrusted to the troops of the Don Front, commanded by K.K. Rokossovsky.

Soviet command January 8, 1943 presented an ultimatum to the troops of Paulus, in which they were asked to capitulate. The command of the encircled group, following Hitler's order, refused to accept the ultimatum.

January 10 at 8 a.m. 05 min. a volley of thousands of guns broke the silence of the frosty morning. The troops of the Don Front proceeded to the final liquidation of the enemy. The troops of the 65th, 21st, 24th, 64th, 57th, 66th and 62nd armies dismembered and destroyed the encircled group in parts. After three days of fierce fighting, the “Marinovsky ledge” of the enemy was cut off. The troops of the 65th and 21st armies reached the western bank of Rossoshka and the Karpovka area. The 57th and 64th armies crossed the line of the Chervlenaya River.

Discipline was falling in the enemy troops, panic moods increasingly arose in subunits and units.

On the morning of January 15, the attackers captured the Pitomnik airfield, where the meeting of the 65th and 24th armies took place. Paulus' headquarters moved from Gumrak even closer to Stalingrad. The total area of ​​the encirclement area was significantly preserved and now amounted to about 600 square meters. km.

On January 22, the troops of the Don Front stormed the enemy on the entire front. Thousands of guns and mortars paved the way for the advancing. In four days, the Soviet armies advanced another 10-15 km. The 21st Army captured Gumrak, an important stronghold of the Nazis.

The distance between the troops of the 21st and 65th armies was only 3.5 km. In the first half of the day on January 26, the armies united in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe village of "Red October" and on the slopes of the Mameva Kurgan. The encircled grouping was divided into two groups: the southern one, pinned down in the central part of the city, and the northern one, squeezed in the “Barricades” area.

On January 30, the troops of the 64th and 57th armies, having dismembered the enemy's southern grouping, approached the city center tightly. The 21st Army advanced from the northwest. January 31, the enemy was forced to lay down their arms.

It was necessary to force the enemy's northern group of troops to lay down their arms, as its commander, General Strekker, rejected the offer of surrender.

On February 1, powerful artillery and aviation strikes were brought down on the enemy in the morning. In many areas occupied by the Nazis, white flags appeared.

February 2, 1943 the northern group of troops, surrounded in the factory district of Stalingrad, also capitulated. Over 40 thousand German soldiers and officers led by General Strecker laid down their arms. The fighting on the banks of the Volga ceased.

During the liquidation of the encircled grouping from January 10 to February 2, 1943. troops of the Don Front under the command of General K.K. Rokosovsky was defeated by 22 enemy divisions and over 160 reinforcement and maintenance units. 91 thousand Nazis, including over 2500 officers and 24 generals, were taken prisoner. In these battles, the enemy lost over 147 thousand. soldiers and officers.

In the winter of 1943, the German command began to actively prepare for the summer battles. The fascist German command decided to launch a major offensive operation in the summer of 1943 and once again seize the strategic initiative. The idea of ​​the operation was to encircle and destroy the Soviet troops in the Kursk ledge with powerful counter strikes from the Orel and Belgorod regions to Kursk. In the future, the enemy intended to defeat the Soviet troops in the Donbass. “For the implementation of the operation near Kursk, called the Citadel, the enemy concentrated huge forces and appointed the most experienced military leaders: 50 divisions, including. 16 tank, Army Group Center (commanded by Field Marshal G. Kluge) and Army Group South (commanded by Field Marshal E. Manstein). In total, over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns, and more than 2,000 aircraft were part of the enemy strike groups. An important place in the enemy’s plan was given to the use of new military equipment - the Tiger and Panther tanks, as well as new aircraft (Focke-Wulf-190A fighters and Henschel-129 attack aircraft).

Having revealed the offensive plan of the fascist German command, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to wear out and bleed the enemy's shock groupings with a deliberate defense, and then complete their complete defeat with a decisive counteroffensive. The defense of the Kursk ledge was assigned to the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts. Both fronts numbered more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2650 aircraft. “Troops of the Central Front (48th, 13th, 70th, 65th, 60th combined arms armies, 2nd tank army, 16th air army, 9th and 19th separate tank corps) under the command of General K.K. Rokossovsky were supposed to repel the enemy's offensive from the side of Orel. In front of the Voronezh Front (38th, 40th, 6th and 7th Guards, 69th Armies, 1st Tank Army, 2nd Air Army, 35th Guards Rifle Corps, 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps) , commanded by General N.F. Vatutin, the task was to repel the enemy’s offensive from Belgorod.” The Steppe Military District was deployed in the rear of the Kursk ledge (since July 9 - the Steppe Front: 4th and 5th Guards, 27th, 47th, 53rd armies, 5th Guards Tank Army, 5th Air Army, 1 rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized, 3 cavalry corps), which was the strategic reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters.

Enemy troops: in the Oryol-Kursk direction - the 9th and 2nd armies of the Army Group "Center" (50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized divisions; commander - Field Marshal G. Kluge), in the Belgorod-Kursk direction - 4th Panzer Army and Operational Group "Kempf" of the Army Group "South" (commander - Field Marshal E. Manstein).

The commander of the central front considered Ponyri and Kursk the most probable direction of action for the main enemy forces, and Maloarkhangelsk and Gnilets as auxiliary ones. Therefore, he decided to concentrate the main forces of the front on the right wing. The decisive massing of forces and means in the direction of the expected enemy strike made it possible to create high densities in the zone of the 13th Army (32 km) - 94 guns and mortars, of which more than 30 anti-tank artillery guns, and about 9 tanks per 1 km of the front.

It was decided to concentrate the main forces in the center and on the left wing of the front. The armies of the first echelon received wide lines of defense. On the basis of our reconnaissance data and the testimonies of the prisoners, it was established that the enemy offensive would begin on July 5. On the morning of July 5, the Oryol grouping of the enemy, under the cover of artillery fire and with the support of aviation, went on the offensive, inflicting the main blow on Olkhovatka, and auxiliary ones on Maloarkhangelsk and Fatezh.

In the afternoon, the commander of the 13th Army, General N.P. Pukhov, advanced several tank and self-propelled artillery units and mobile barrier detachments to the main lane, and the front commander - howitzer and mortar brigades to the Olkhovatka area. The advance of the enemy was halted. On this day, fierce battles unfolded in the air. The 16th Air Army supported the fighting operations of the defending troops of the central front. By the end of the day, at the cost of huge losses, the enemy managed to advance 6-8 km in the Olkhovat direction. In other directions, his attacks were not successful.

Having determined the direction of the main efforts of the enemy, the front commander decided on the morning of July 6 to launch a counterattack from the Olkhovatka area to Gnilusha in order to restore the position of the 13th Army. As a result of the counterattack, the enemy was stopped in front of the second line of defense ... After the counterattack, the 2nd Panzer Army and the 19th Tank Corps went over to the defensive behind the second line.

On the same day, the enemy launched an offensive in the direction of Oboyan and Korocha. Having not achieved success in the Olkhovat direction, the enemy launched an offensive on Ponyri on the morning of July 7. When enemy units broke into the northwestern outskirts of the Ponyri station, the division commander, General M. A. Enshin concentrated artillery and mortar fire on them, then, with the forces of the second echelon and the attached tank brigade, launched a counterattack and restored the situation. On July 8 and 9, the enemy continued attacks on Olkhovatka and Ponyri, and on July 10 against the troops of the right flank of the 70th Army, but all his attempts to break through the second line of defense were thwarted. Having exhausted its reserves, the enemy was forced to abandon the offensive and on July 11 went on the defensive.

Against the troops of the Voronezh Front, the enemy launched a general offensive also on the morning of July 5, inflicting the main blow with the forces of the 4th Panzer Army on Oboyan, and the auxiliary operational group Kempf on Korocha. By the end of the day, the troops of this army had inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and stopped his attacks. The main strip of our defense was broken through only in separate sections. In the Korochan direction, the enemy managed to force the Northern Donets south of Belgorod and capture a small bridgehead.

In the current situation, the front commander decided to cover the Oboyan direction. To this end, on the night of July 6, he advanced to the second line of defense the 1st Tank Army of General M. E. Katukov, as well as the 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, operationally subordinate to the 6th Guards Army. In addition, the army was reinforced by front-line artillery.

On the morning of July 6, the enemy resumed the offensive in all directions. Only by the end of the day did he manage to wedge into the second lane of our defense.

From July 9 to 11, the enemy brought additional reserves into the battle and at any cost sought to break through along the Belgorod highway to Kursk. To help the 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies, the front command promptly put forward part of its artillery. In addition, the 10th Tank Corps was regrouped to cover the Oboyan direction and the main aviation forces were aimed, and the 5th Guards Tank Corps was regrouped to strengthen the right flank of the 1st Tank Army. “With the joint efforts of the ground forces and aviation, almost all enemy attacks were repulsed. Only on July 9, in the Kochetovka area, enemy tanks managed to break through to the third line of our defense. But two divisions of the 5th Guards Army of the Steppe Front and advanced tank brigades of the 5th Guards Tank Army were advanced against them, which stopped the advance of enemy tanks.”

In the offensive of the enemy, a crisis was clearly ripe. Therefore, Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, chairman of the headquarters of the Supreme High Command, and General N. F. Vatutin, commander of the Voronezh Front, decided on the morning of July 12 to launch a counterattack from the Prokhorovka area with the forces of the 5th Guards Army, General A. S. Zhdanov and the 5th Guards Tank Army, General P. A. Rotmistrov, as well as the forces of the 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies in the general direction of Yakovlevo with the aim of finally defeating the enemy grouping that had penetrated. From the air, the counterattack was to be provided by the main forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies.

On the morning of July 12, the troops of the Voronezh Front launched a counterattack. The main events unfolded in the area of ​​the Prokhorovka railway station. On both sides, up to 1200 tanks and self-propelled guns simultaneously participated in the battle. Aviation support of the enemy strike force was carried out by the aviation of the Army Group "South". Air strikes against the enemy were carried out by the 2nd Air Army, units of the 17th Air Army, and long-range aviation. Not having reached the intended goal - to capture Kursk from the southeast, the enemy went on the defensive.

July 12 came a turning point in the Battle of Kursk. By order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. The Hitlerite command was forced to abandon offensive plans and on July 16 began to withdraw its troops to their original position. The troops of the Voronezh, and from July 18 and the Steppe Fronts, proceeded to pursue the enemy, and by the end of July 23, they had mainly reached the line, which they occupied by the beginning of the defensive battle.

The Western Front received the task of delivering the main blow by the troops of the 11th Guards Army from the area southwest of Kozelsk to Khotynets, together with the 61st Army of the Bryansk Front, to encircle and destroy the Bolkhov grouping of the enemy. The Bryansk front was supposed to deliver the main blow by the troops of the 3rd and 63rd armies from the Novosil region to Orel, and the auxiliary one - by the forces of the 61st army to Bolkhov.

Central Front: Eliminate the enemy’s wedged grouping north of Olkhovatka, complete the defeat of the enemy. The combat operations of our troops were to be supported by more than 3 thousand aircraft of the 1st, 15th and 16th air armies (commanded by Generals M. M. Gromov, N. F. Naumenko, S I. Rudenko) of the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts, as well as long-range aviation.

On the morning of July 12, after a powerful air and artillery preparation, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive. Success was achieved in the direction of the main attack of the Western Front. By the middle of the day, the troops of the 11th Guards Army broke through the enemy's main line of defense and crossed the Fomina River. In the afternoon of July 12, the 5th Panzer Corps was introduced into the battle, and by the middle of July 13, the breakthrough of the second line of its defense was completed.

After the completion of the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone, the 5th Tank Corps and the 1st Tank Corps, introduced into the breakthrough to the right, together with the forward detachments of rifle formations, proceeded to pursue the enemy. By the morning of July 15, they reached the Vytebet River and crossed it, and by the end of the next day they cut the Bolkhov-Khotynets road. To delay their advance, the enemy pulled up reserves and launched a series of counterattacks.

Having repelled the enemy's counterattacks, the troops of the 11th Guards Army resumed the offensive and by July 19 advanced to 60 km, expanding the breakthrough to 120 km and covering the left flank of the enemy's Bolkhov grouping from the southwest.

In order to finally defeat the enemy and develop the offensive, in the middle of the day on July 26, the commander of the Western Front brought into battle in the band of the 11th Guards Army the 4th Tank Army transferred to him from the Stavka reserve (commander General V. M. Badanov).

The 4th Panzer Army, after a short artillery preparation with the support of aviation, went on the offensive against Bolkhov, and then struck at Khotynets and Karachev. In five days, she advanced 12 - 20 km. She had to break through the intermediate defensive lines previously occupied by enemy troops. On July 30, the troops of the left wing of the Western Front were transferred to the Bryansk Front.

The offensive of the Bryansk Front developed much more slowly than that of the Western Front. The troops of the 61st Army under the command of General P. A. Belov, together with the 20th Tank Corps, broke through the enemy’s defenses and, repelling his counterattacks, liberated Bolkhov on July 29.

In order to accelerate the defeat of the Oryol grouping of the enemy, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command transferred the 3rd Guards Tank Army (commander General P.S. Rybalko) from its reserve to the Bryansk Front. On the morning of July 19, with the support of formations of the 1st and 15th air armies and long-range aviation, it went on the offensive from the line of Bogdanovo, Podmaslovo and, repelling strong enemy counterattacks, broke through its defenses on the Oleshnya River by the end of the day. On the night of July 20, the tank army struck in the direction of Otrada. On the morning of July 21, after a regrouping of forces, the army struck at the Stanovoi Kolodez and captured it on July 26. The next day, she was handed over to the Central Front.

By the end of July, the troops of three fronts engulfed the enemy's Oryol grouping from the north, east and south. The fascist German command, in an effort to avert the threat of encirclement, on July 30 began the withdrawal of all its troops from the Oryol bridgehead. The Soviet troops began to pursue. On the morning of August 4, the troops of the left wing of the Bryansk Front broke into Oryol and liberated it by the morning of August 5. On the same day, Belgorod was liberated by the troops of the Steppe Front.

Having mastered Orel, our troops continued the offensive. On August 18, they reached the line Zhizdra, Litizh. As a result of the Oryol operation, 14 enemy divisions were defeated (including 6 tank divisions)

The Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead was defended by the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force. They consisted of 18 divisions, including 4 tank divisions. Here the enemy created 7 defensive lines with a total depth of up to 90 km, as well as 1 bypass around Belgorod and 2 around Kharkov.

The idea of ​​​​the headquarters of the Supreme High Command was to cut the opposing enemy grouping into two parts with powerful blows from the troops of the adjacent wings of the Voronezh and steppe fronts, subsequently deeply cover it in the Kharkov region and destroy it in cooperation with the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front.

The troops of the Voronezh Front delivered the main blow with the forces of two combined arms and two tank armies from the area northeast of Tomarovka to Bogodukhov, Valki, bypassing Kharkov from the west, auxiliary, also by the forces of two combined arms armies, from the Proletarsky area in the direction of Boromlya, in order to cover the main groups from the West.

The steppe front under the command of General I. S. Konev delivered the main blow by the troops of the 53rd and part of the forces of the 69th army from the area northwest of Belgorod to Kharkov from the north, the auxiliary - by the forces of the 7th Guards Army from the area southeast of Belgorod to western direction.

By decision of the commander of the Southwestern Front, General R. Ya. Malinovsky, the 57th Army launched a strike from the Martovaya area to Merefa, covering Kharkov from the southeast.

“From the air, the offensive of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts was provided, respectively, by the 2nd and 5th air armies of generals S. A. Krasovsky and S. K. Goryunov. their main strikes, which made it possible to create high operational densities. So, in the zone of the 5th Guards Army of the Voronezh Front, they reached 1.5 km per rifle division, 230 guns and mortars and 70 tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of the front.

For aviation support of each tank army, one assault and one fighter aviation division was allocated. “From July 28 to August 6, the 38th Army, operating on the right wing of the Voronezh Front, simulated the concentration of a large group of troops in the Sumy direction. The fascist German command not only began bombing the areas of false concentration of troops, but also kept a significant number of its reserves in this direction.

On August 3, after powerful artillery preparation and air strikes, the troops of the fronts, supported by a barrage of fire, went on the offensive and successfully broke through the first position of the enemy. With the introduction of the second echelons of the regiments into battle, the second position was broken through. To build up the efforts of the 5th Guards Army, advanced tank brigades of the corps of the first echelon of tank armies were brought into battle. They, together with rifle divisions, completed the breakthrough of the enemy's main line of defense. Following the advanced brigades, the main forces of the tank armies were brought into battle. By the end of the day, they overcame the second line of enemy defense and advanced 12-26 km deep, thereby separating the enemy's Tomarovsk and Belgorod centers of resistance.

Simultaneously with the tank armies, the following were introduced into the battle: in the zone of the 6th Guards Army - the 5th Guards Tank Corps, and in the zone of the 53rd Army - the 1st Mechanized Corps. They, together with rifle formations, broke the enemy's resistance, completed the breakthrough of the main line of defense, and by the end of the day approached the second defensive line. Having broken through the tactical defense zone and defeated the nearest operational reserves, the main strike force of the Voronezh Front, on the morning of the second day of the operation, proceeded to pursue the enemy.

On August 4, the troops of the 1st Panzer Army from the Tomarovka region began to develop an offensive to the south. Its 6th tank and 3rd mechanized corps, by the middle of the day on August 6, advanced 70 km. In the afternoon of the next day, the 6th Panzer Corps liberated Bogodukhov.

The 5th Guards Tank Army, bypassing enemy resistance centers from the west, attacked Zolochev and broke into the city on August 6.

By this time, the troops of the 6th Guards Army had captured the enemy's defense center Tomarovka, surrounded and destroyed his Borisov group. The 4th and 5th Guards Tank Corps played a major role in this. Developing the offensive in a southwestern direction, they bypassed the Borisov group of Germans from the west and east, and on August 7, with a swift blow on the move, they broke into Grayvoron, thereby cutting off the enemy's escape routes to the west and south. The troops of the Steppe Front, having completed the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone of the enemy on August 4, by the end of the next day took Belgorod by storm, after which they began to develop an offensive against Kharkov. By the end of August 7, the front of the breakthrough of our troops reached 120 km. Tank armies advanced to a depth of up to 100 km, and combined arms armies - up to 60 - 65 km.

“The troops of the 40th and 27th armies, continuing to develop the offensive, by August 11 reached the line of Bromlya, Trostyanets, Akhtyrka. A company of the 12th Guards Tank Brigade, led by Captain I. A. Tereshchuk, broke into Akhtyrka on August 10, where it was surrounded by the enemy. For two days, Soviet tankers, without communication with the brigade, were in besieged tanks, repulsing the fierce attacks of the Nazis, who were trying to capture them alive. In two days of fighting, the company destroyed 6 tanks, 2 self-propelled guns, 5 armored cars and up to 150 enemy soldiers and officers. With two surviving tanks, Captain Tereshchuk fought out of the encirclement and returned to his brigade. For decisive and skillful actions in battle, Captain I. A. Tereshchuk was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.”

By August 10, the main forces of the 1st Panzer Army had reached the line of the Merchik River. The 5th Guards Tank Army was reassigned to the Steppe Front and began to regroup in the Bogodukhov area.

Advancing behind the tank armies, the troops of the 6th Guards Army reached the northeast of Krasnokutsk by August 11, and the 5th Guards Army captured Kharkov from the west. The troops of the Steppe Front by this time approached the outer defensive contour of Kharkov from the north, and the 57th Army, transferred to this front on August 8, from the east and southeast.

By August 11, the fascist German command had concentrated three tank divisions east of Bogodukhov (Reich, Dead Head, Viking) and on the morning of August 12 launched a counterattack on the advancing troops of the 1st Panzer Army in the general direction of Bogodukhov. An oncoming tank battle unfolded, but could not break through to Bogodukhov. On the morning of August 13, the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank, 6th and 5th Guards Armies were brought into battle. The main forces of front-line aviation were also sent here. She conducted reconnaissance and carried out operations to disrupt the railway and road transport of the Nazis. By the end of August 17, our troops finally thwarted the enemy's counterattack from the south to Bogodukhov.

Then the troops of the right wing of the Voronezh Front struck at the rear of the Akhtyrskaya group of Germans and completely defeated it.

The troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts defeated 15 enemy divisions, advanced 140 km to the south and south-west, came close to the enemy's Donbass grouping. Soviet troops liberated Kharkov. During the occupation and fighting, the Nazis destroyed in the city and region (according to incomplete data) about 300 thousand civilians and prisoners of war, about 160 thousand people were driven to Germany, destroyed 1600 thousand m2 of housing, over 500 industrial enterprises, all cultural and educational , medical and communal institutions.

Thus, the Soviet troops completed the defeat of the entire Belgorod-Kharkov enemy grouping and took an advantageous position to go on a general offensive in order to liberate the Left-Bank Ukraine and Donbass.

The counteroffensive of the Red Army near Kursk ended for us with an outstanding victory. Irreparable losses were inflicted on the enemy, and all his attempts to hold strategic footholds in the Orel and Kharkov regions were frustrated. For the heroism shown in the battles, over 100 thousand Soviet soldiers were awarded orders and medals, 60 people. were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, among them fighter pilots senior lieutenants A.K. Gorodets and A.P. Maresyev, captain L.A. Belgium, Sergeant S.P. Zorin and many others.

Victory at Kursk and the exit of Soviet troops to the Dnieper completed a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War. The balance of power changed dramatically in favor of the Red Army. After the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the Nazi command was forced to completely abandon the offensive strategy and go over to the defensive on the entire Soviet-German front. The Red Army firmly seized the strategic initiative in the conduct of military operations.

The Battle of Kursk demonstrated to the whole world the ability of the Soviet Union and its Red Army to defeat fascist Germany and its allies on their own. The front of the national liberation struggle of the peoples of Europe expanded and became more active. The victory at the Kursk Salient was of great international significance: it raised even higher the prestige of the Soviet Union as the decisive force in the Second World War. The Soviet state demonstrated its invincible might.

After the victorious completion of the Battle of Kursk, Soviet troops in September 1943. began the heroic battle for the Dnieper. The most important task was to force the river, seize bridgeheads for the subsequent offensive and liberation of the Right-Bank Ukraine.

In the summer, the Nazi command took measures to create the so-called “Eastern Wall” along the Dnieper, which was declared impregnable. However, the Nazis failed to gain a foothold at the turn of the Dnieper.

On September 15, the fascist German command issued an order for a general withdrawal of the troops of Army Group South to the Melitopol-Dnepr line. The retreat beyond the Dnieper and Molochnaya, to the Eastern Wall, was to be carried out by all the troops of Army Group South. The decision to withdraw troops north of Kiev from the Desna to the Dnieper was made dependent on the further development of events.

The armies defending in Ukraine received new tasks. The 4th Panzer Army retreated to the line of the Desna and the Dnieper: the left flank - to Chernigov, and the right - to the crossings at Kanev. At the same time, the army commander was pointed out the particular importance of preventing the breakthrough of Soviet tank formations into the Kiev area. The 8th Army retreated to the line of the Dnieper and was supposed to cross it between Tripoli (40 km southeast of Kiev) and Kremenchug. The 1st Panzer Army was ordered to retreat to the Dnieper in the strip from Kremenchug to Zaporozhye. She was ordered to hold a foothold near Zaporozhye. The 6th Army, retreating, was to take up positions on the Molochnaya River and in front of the Melitopol-Zaporozhye railway.

The ultimate goal of the planned retreat was considered to be the holding of a defensive line on the Dnieper, which intercepted the offensive paths of the Soviet Army in the main strategic directions. Withdrawing troops from the left-bank Ukraine, the Nazi command carried out a plan for the complete devastation of the abandoned territory. The SS units and the police took an active part in the total devastation of the abandoned areas ... Himmler set the task of destroying the Donbass on September 7th. Thus, in mid-September, the fascist German command was forced to admit the collapse of its plans to stabilize the front line on the lines, which were occupied by the end of the Battle of Kursk, and go on a deep retreat of the Wehrmacht. The question of the liberation of the Left-bank Ukraine was already a foregone conclusion.

“The Soviet Supreme High Command clearly understood the great importance of the Dnieper for the retreating enemy, and did everything to ensure that the Soviet troops crossed it on the move, seized bridgeheads on the right bank and did not allow the enemy to gain a foothold on this line. The primary task was to prevent the planned withdrawal of Wehrmacht formations beyond the Dnieper, to deprive him of the opportunity to stop the offensive of the Soviet Army. In the middle and in the second half of September, the main efforts of the Soviet troops advancing on the Left-Bank Ukraine were directed to the solution of this problem. The question of the time and pace of the offensive acquired exceptional importance.”

The command of the fronts and armies had to organize the pursuit in difficult conditions. In early September, all five tank armies had to be withdrawn to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command for understaffing. Separate tank and mechanized corps were also weakened. By the beginning of the withdrawal of the Nazis, there were no strong mobile formations and formations in the fronts. The enemy had greater mobility than the advancing Soviet troops. As we moved towards the Dnieper, the activity of Soviet aviation decreased due to the difficulties of relocating it to new airfields.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Supreme High Command sought to speed up the advance of troops to the Dnieper. This made it possible to reach the Dnieper on a wide front and thwart the plan of the fascist command to make the Eastern Wall impregnable. The implementation of a systematic retreat from the Left-Bank Ukraine and the organization of a strong defense on the Dnieper posed difficult tasks for the Wehrmacht. In the second half of September, the pace and scope of the offensive of the Soviet troops continued to grow. It developed most successfully in the zone of the Central and Voronezh fronts, reinforced by the reserves of the Stavka, in the Kiev and Gomel directions. The gap in the front at the junction of Army Groups "Center" and "South" was expanding more and more. The efforts of the fascist German command to restore direct communication between them did not lead to success.

The troops of the right wing of the Central Front crossed the Desna and on September 16 liberated Novgorod-Seversky. The German defense on the Desna collapsed, and the Wehrmacht command could no longer, relying on this defensive line, strike at the flank and rear of the Soviet troops advancing in the Gomel and Kiev directions. The troops of the left wing of the Central Front continued to develop the offensive towards the Dnieper. On the night of September 19, troops of the Central Front crossed the Desna east and southwest of Chernigov. Having captured bridgeheads on the right bank, the main forces of the 13th Army continued to develop the offensive to the Dnieper, and part of the forces bypassed Chernigov from the east and west. Formations of the 61st Army and the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps advanced towards the city from the northeast.

On September 21, Soviet troops, with strikes from the east, south and west, defeated the Nazi formations defending Chernigov and liberated this regional center of Ukraine - the most important stronghold of the German defense in the lower reaches of the Desna, 40 km from the Dnieper. Their defense, prepared along the western bank, was overcome along the entire Desna. Ten formations and units of the 13th, 61st, 16th air armies were given the honorary name of Chernigov by order of the Supreme Commander.

The offensive of the Central Front continued to develop successfully. The German fascist formations, trying to get out of the blows, hastily retreated beyond the Dnieper. On September 21, the advanced units of the left wing of the front reached the Dnieper north of Kyiv. However, overcoming a powerful water barrier presented great difficulties. The advanced units reached the Dnieper without regular crossing facilities, the rear fell far behind. By the time the Soviet Army reached the Dnieper, the enemy did not have time to complete the construction of defensive structures and fully prepare a defensive line on its right bank. However, he fiercely resisted the Soviet troops that had come to the river.

The troops of the 13th Army of General N.P. Pukhov were the first to cross the Dnieper in the Mnevo sector, the mouth of the Pripyat River. Its forward detachments reached the river on September 21 and the next day captured a bridgehead on the right bank. Forcing was carried out on improvised means under strong blows from enemy aircraft.

After the forward detachments clung to the right bank of the Dnieper, a special pontoon technique was set in motion.

By the end of September 22, the 13th Army had captured a bridgehead 25 km along the front and from 2 to 10 km in depth and reached the line of Mnevo, Lukoedy, Upper Zhary, Teremtsy, the mouth of the Pripyat. The next day, she advanced up to 35 km west of the Dnieper and captured a bridgehead on the right bank of the Pripyat at its mouth.

The offensive of the troops of the right wing and the center of the Voronezh Front, the Steppe, South-Western and Southern Fronts was successfully developing. In an effort to make fuller use of the results achieved, on September 25, the Headquarters demanded that the commanders of the fronts, with the release of their armies to the Dnieper, “immediately force it on a wide front in order to disperse the attention and forces of the enemy. Move anti-aircraft weapons to the crossings to reliably protect them from enemy air strikes” 3 .

From September 24 to 30, fierce battles were fought between the formations of the 13th Army and the Nazi troops in the interfluve of the Dnieper and Pripyat. The Nazis pulled up parts of four tank divisions here and with stubborn counterattacks tried to push the Soviet troops back to the eastern coast. Overcoming the enemy's fierce resistance, the formations of the 13th Army continued to expand the bridgehead and by the end of September not only cleared the enemy from the interfluve of the Dnieper and Pripyat in the Ma-shev area, but also captured bridgeheads on Pripyat: one - northwest of Chernobyl (length up to 19 km , up to 10 km deep), the second - southeast of this city (10 km along the front, up to 8 km deep).

South of the 13th Army, the 60th Army and the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps successfully crossed the Dnieper. By the end of September, they captured a bridgehead 20 km along the front and 12 km deep on the western bank of the Dnieper - from the mouth of the Pripyat to the Teterev River - and a small bridgehead in the Yasnogorodka area. To the north of the 13th Army, the 61st Army crossed the Dnieper with part of its forces.

By the end of September, the Central Front, in cooperation with other fronts, achieved a major operational success. Pursuing the enemy, his troops crossed the Dnieper, Pripyat and Sozh on the move and captured several bridgeheads on their western banks, which played a big role in the subsequent struggle to capture the border of the Dnieper and in defeating the enemy in Right-Bank Ukraine.

Since September 19, the resistance of the Nazis in the Voronezh Front has sharply weakened. Taking into account the current situation, General N.F. Vatutin demanded to develop the offensive to the Dnieper at a higher pace and force it on the move. In solving this problem, an important role was assigned to the mobile group of the front. It included the 3rd Guards Tank Army and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, transferred to the Voronezh Front from the Stavka reserve. By September 19, they concentrated in the Romny area and on the night of the 20th launched an offensive in the direction of Pereyaslav-Khmelnitsky.

The pace of the advance of the troops of the right wing and the center of the Voronezh Front increased sharply. “In the offensive zone of the 40th Army, one of the first to reach the Dnieper in the Pereyaslav-Khmelnitsky region was the forward detachment of the 309th rifle division of General D. F. Dremin.

In those days, the country learned about the courage of the Komsomol members V. N. Ivanov, N. E. Petukhov, I. D. Semenov and V. A. Sysolyatin. They were the first to cross the Dnieper and ensured the crossing of the river by units of the 51st Guards Tank Brigade. For the valor and military skill shown during the crossing and in the battles for the bridgehead on the right bank, Komsomol patriots received the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Guards Private Nikolai Petukhov was awarded this title posthumously.”

While fighting was going on to expand the Bukrinsky bridgehead, the formations of the 38th Army of General N. E. Chibisov began to force the Dnieper in the Lyutezh area. By the end of September 29, they captured a bridgehead up to 8 km along the front and up to 1 km in depth, and by October 10, the bridgehead was expanded to 15 km along the front and up to 5-10 km in depth.

By the time the Soviet troops reached the Dnieper in the offensive zone of the left wing of the Central Front, the right wing and the center of the Voronezh Front, the fascist German command had only seven infantry and three tank divisions on the right bank of the Dnieper, exhausted by the previous battles, and they had not yet had time to turn around for defense . Enemy formations that had not been withdrawn by September 22 from the Left-Bank Ukraine were subjected to crushing blows from the Soviet armies.

From September 22 to 30, the troops of the Voronezh Front fought for bridgeheads on the right bank of the Dnieper and cleared the left bank of the remaining enemy units. After tense fighting, the 38th Army liquidated an important Nazi bridgehead in the Darnitsa region (a suburb of Kiev on the left bank of the Dnieper), on which seven German divisions defended. During the crossing of the river, fierce air battles unfolded. They were especially tense in the area of ​​​​the Bukrinsky bridgehead.

By the end of September, the armies of the Voronezh Front captured nine small bridgeheads north and south of Kyiv, including Bukrinsky and Lyutezhsky. This largely violated the enemy defenses on the right bank of the Dnieper.

At the same time, the fascist German command hastily deployed on the right bank, especially in the region of Kiev, divisions and reserves that had crossed over.

The formations of the Steppe Front by September 20 were fighting 70-120 km from the Dnieper. Under their up to 20 divisions of the 8th and 1st tank armies retreated under pressure. The right wing of the front - the 5th Guards and 53rd armies - covered Poltava from the north and south and had the task of liberating this large regional center of Ukraine. The 69th and 7th Guards Armies advanced in the center of the front.

On September 20, General I. S. Konev set the task of pursuing the retreating enemy, defeating the Nazi formations in the Kremenchug and Dneprodzerzhinsk directions, and on the move to force the Dnieper, seize bridgeheads on the right bank. The forcing of the Dnieper was planned on a front 130 km long.

After stubborn fighting, by the morning of September 23, the 5th Guards and 53rd Armies of the Steppe Front liberated the city of Russian glory Poltava, turned by the Nazi invaders into a powerful defensive center. From September 25 to 30, the troops of the Steppe Front in their entire offensive zone reached the Dnieper, cleared the left bank and captured five bridgeheads on the right bank. A major role in the successful forcing of the Dnieper was played by the entry into battle of the 37th Army.

On September 22, the troops of the right wing of the Southwestern Front reached the Dnieper south of Dnepropetrovsk and, having forced it on September 25, captured small bridgeheads on the right bank. On September 22, the troops of the left wing of the front reached the outer contour of the Zaporozhye bridgehead of the enemy. The troops of the Southern Front on the same day approached the defensive line on Molochnaya. The liberation of Donbass, the withdrawal of the Soviet Army to the Zaporozhye region, to Molochnaya and the capture of bridgeheads on the right bank of the Dnieper marked the end of an important stage in the long and intense struggle of the Southwestern and Southern fronts to defeat a large enemy grouping in southern Ukraine. The exit of the Soviet Army to the Dnieper and Molochnaya created a serious threat to the Nazi defense in the lower reaches of the Dnieper and on the outskirts of the Crimea. The victory of the South-Western and Southern fronts changed the military-political situation in the Black Sea basin and influenced the policy of the states of this region. Its economic importance was also great. The most important coal and metallurgical base of the South, the richest agricultural region, was returned to the Soviet country.

To the north, on the middle Dnieper, the Nazi troops continued to fight fiercely, trying to destroy the Soviet units that had crossed to the right bank.

As a result of the offensive of five fronts closely interacting with each other during August - September 1943, outstanding successes were achieved in the southwestern direction. Soviet troops advanced 250-300 km, forcing a number of rivers during the offensive. By the end of September, they reached the Dnieper on a 700-kilometer front - from Loev to Zaporozhye. The aggressor suffered a heavy defeat in the Left-bank Ukraine. His 2nd, 4th tank, 8th, 1st tank, 6th armies suffered heavy losses. Millions of Soviet people were rescued from fascist slavery. The invaders lost the most important economic regions.

The Soviet soldiers were not stopped by such a powerful water barrier as the Dnieper. The rapid withdrawal of Soviet troops on a broad front to the Dnieper was unexpected for the Nazi command. The Soviet Army achieved strategic surprise, using which the troops captured 23 bridgeheads on the western bank of the Dnieper and two bridgeheads on the Pripyat.

The outstanding victories of the five fronts in the southwestern direction are the merit of all branches of the armed forces and combat arms. Forcing the Dnieper on the move using improvised means after heavy offensive battles is an unprecedented feat of arms in the history of wars

The Soviet-German front continued to be the main, decisive front of World War II. In the battles that took place here, the main forces of the Wehrmacht and the armies of Germany's satellites were crushed. The victorious offensive of the Soviet troops in 1943 radically changed the strategic situation on the Soviet-German front, had a decisive influence on the further course of the entire Second World War, leading to the collapse of the fascist bloc. After the defeats suffered in the East, Nazi Germany was forced to switch to strategic defense on all fronts.

As a result of the victory in the Battle of Kursk, as well as the entry of Soviet troops to the Dnieper, a radical turning point ended not only in the Great Patriotic War, but also in the Second World War as a whole. Decisive, irreversible shifts have taken place in the correlation of forces between the belligerent coalitions in the military, political and economic fields, and in the strategic situation in the theaters of operations.

The outstanding victories of the Red Army during the summer-autumn campaign of 1943 embodied the results of the heroic labor of the Soviet people to strengthen and further develop the military might of the country. A tense struggle was already waged in conditions of general superiority in forces and means over the enemy. The Soviet Armed Forces had in sufficient quantities the most advanced equipment for that time, had rich combat experience, and outnumbered the enemy in the number of tanks, aircraft and artillery.

The rapid rise of the military economy made it possible for the Soviet command to carry out a significant quantitative and qualitative build-up of the forces of the army in the field. The enemy was faced with the need to fight with more powerful groupings of Soviet troops than in the previous stages of the war. During the attack on Kursk, the German armies faced such a strong defense that they had not met before either on the Soviet-German front or in other theaters of the Second World War. A particularly sharp increase in the efforts of the Red Army and an increase in the scope of the struggle occurred from the moment the Soviet troops went over to the counteroffensive, and then to the general strategic offensive.

If in the counteroffensive near Moscow, Soviet aviation numbered 1 thousand aircraft, then in the counteroffensive near Kursk - already 4300. V the counteroffensive near Stalingrad, the troops had 15.5 thousand guns and mortars, and in the counteroffensive near Kursk - 33 thousand.

In the Battle of Kursk, the fascist German command for the first time met the Soviet tank troops, superior in quality and quantity, united in the tank armies of the new organization. The growth of the power of the armored forces of the Red Army proceeded at a rapid pace. If 1500 tanks participated in the counteroffensive near Stalingrad, then more than 4.8 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns took part in the counteroffensive near Kursk.

The struggle on the Soviet-German front acquired even greater scope during the general offensive of the Red Army in the summer-autumn campaign of 1943. 53 combined arms, 5 tank and 9 air armies took part in it.

In the combat operations of the Soviet troops in the summer of 1943, a qualitatively new phenomenon was the widespread use of technical means of combat, primarily tank and mechanized formations and formations. Their massing in the direction of the main attack gave offensive operations a decisive and maneuverable character, and made it possible to conduct an offensive at a high pace and to great depths. A major role in the armed struggle belonged to the quantitatively and qualitatively increased Soviet aviation. She won air supremacy and firmly held it until the end of the war.

The scope of the struggle imposed on the enemy exceeded the material and moral capabilities of the Wehrmacht. The collapse of the offensive strategy of the fascist German army, and then the crisis of its defensive strategy, became inevitable.

1. Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. T.2. M., 1974.

2. Collection of materials on the history of military art in the Great Patriotic War. Issue 5. V.2.//Edited by A.I. Gotovtseva. M., 1955.

3. The Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War // Ed. A.M. Samsonov. M., 1985.

4. History of military art. // Ed. THEIR. Bagramyan. M., 1970.

5. Great Patriotic War. 1941-1945. Events. People. Documentation. // Ed. O.A. Rzheshevsky. M., 1990.

6. History of the USSR.//Ed. S.A. Seraeva. M., 1983.

7. History of the Second World War 1939-1945. T.6. A turning point in the war. M., 1976.

8. History of the Second World War 1939-1945. T.7. Completion of a radical change in the war. M., 1976.

History of the Second World War 1939-1945. T. 6. A radical change in the war. M., 1976. S. 19.

There. pp. 43-44.

History of the Second World War 1939-1945. T. 6. M., 1976. S. 45.

Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Events. People. Documentation. Brief historical reference book / Under. ed. O. A. Rzheshevsky. M., 1990. S. 16.

Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. v.2. M., 1974. P. 157.

Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Events. People. Documents: Brief historical reference book//Edited by O.A. Rzheshevsky.-M., 1990 p. 153

History of military art. Textbook for higher military educational institutions.// Pod. ed. I. Kh. Bagramyan. M., 1970. S. 219.

There. P.224.

Same place.S. 225.

There. P.226.

History of the Second World War 1939-1945. T.7. Completion of a radical change in the war. M., 1976. S. 206.

After the failure in the battle of Moscow, the Wehrmacht changed its war plan and set a strategic goal to seize the Lower Volga and the Caucasus, seize the southern oil regions and the rich grain regions of the Don and Kuban, cut off the Caucasus from the center of the country and create conditions for ending the war in their favor.

The fighting began on the outskirts of Stalingrad in July 1942. Unable to hold back the onslaught of the enemy, the Soviet troops gradually retreated to the city. In September, the main battles unfolded already on the streets of Stalingrad. But at the cost of the incredible efforts of the Red Army, by winter it was possible to first stop the German offensive, and then go on the counteroffensive. As a result of successful hostilities, the southern grouping of enemy troops was surrounded. His attempts to break through the ring were unsuccessful. On February 2, 1943, the Germans announced their surrender. 300 thousand German soldiers and officers surrendered, including the commander of the 6th army of the enemy, General Paulus.

Fearing a new encirclement, the Nazis hastily withdrew their troops from the North Caucasus they had captured.

The victory in the Battle of Stalingrad had a huge impact on the further course of the war.

1) The battle is one of the most important events of the Second World War and, along with the Battle of Kursk, became a turning point in the course of hostilities, after which the German troops finally lost their strategic initiative. For the Soviet Union, the victory in Stalingrad was the beginning of the liberation of the country and all of Europe from fascism.

2) Colossal damage was inflicted on the German army. In this battle, Germany lost more manpower than in all previous Soviet-German battles combined.

The Battle of Stalingrad is the bloodiest battle in the history of mankind. According to rough estimates, the total losses of both sides in this battle exceed two million people. For Germany, the damage in manpower was so great that until the end of the war she was not able to fully compensate for it.

3) No less catastrophic were the losses of the enemy in tanks and other military equipment.

After the defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad, the German command decided to launch a major offensive in order to regain the lost strategic initiative. For the offensive, the enemy chose the so-called Kursk salient.

The Germans were going to use the surprise factor and launch an offensive on July 5 at 3 o'clock in the morning. But Soviet intelligence managed to find out about the plans of the enemy, and the military leadership of the USSR decided to stun the enemy in his own way - a surprise factor. A few minutes before the start of the German offensive, 19 thousand Soviet guns suddenly came to life. They dealt a crushing artillery blow to the positions of the Nazis. For the Germans, this was a big surprise. They received not only a powerful psychological blow, but also suffered serious losses. The Nazis, having put into action all their reserves, were able to launch the planned offensive only a few hours later. But the plan of attack had already been thwarted. They were able to advance only 30-35 km.

On July 12, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive. On this day, the largest tank battle in world history took place near the village of Prokhorovka, in which 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part. This day was a turning point in the Battle of Kursk. Under the onslaught of Soviet troops, the Germans were forced to go on the defensive. But they were unable to resist the pressure. The Battle of Kursk ended with a crushing victory for Russian weapons.

In this battle, the Germans lost half a million soldiers, 1,500 tanks, and more than 3,500 aircraft.

Completion of the liberation of the territory of the USSR

On March 26, 1944, Soviet troops reached the state border of the USSR. Having liberated the Right-Bank Ukraine, the Red Army proceeded to liquidate the enemy grouping in the Crimea. The Nazi command sought to keep the peninsula at any cost. The offensive of our troops began on April 8, 1944. After the liberation of the Kerch Peninsula and Simferopol on May 5, the assault on Sevastopol began. Particularly stubborn battles were fought on Sapun Mountain. After a five-day assault on May 9, the city of Russian glory was liberated.

In the summer of 1944, in accordance with the plans of the Soviet command, the Red Army delivered the main blow in Belarus. Through it lay the shortest route to the border of Germany. The operation, codenamed "Bagration", in which more than 160 Soviet divisions took part, began on June 23 and came as a complete surprise to the enemy. On July 3, Minsk was liberated, and another ring of encirclement was closed to the east of it, in which more than a million soldiers and officers of the Nazi army turned out to be.

On July 17, in Moscow, 57,000 German soldiers and officers taken prisoner in Belarus were escorted along the Garden Ring, escorted by a convoy. The offensive of the Soviet troops in Belarus developed into a general strategic offensive from the Baltic to the Carpathians, which continued until the end of August. As a result of the Belarusian operation, one of the strongest German groups, the Army Group Center, was destroyed.

Realizing the doom of Nazi Germany, a group of senior German officers organized in July 1944 a conspiracy against Hitler, the purpose of which was to conclude a truce with the Western powers in order to continue the war in the East. On July 20, another unsuccessful attempt was made on Hitler. The Fuhrer miraculously survived. The main participants in the conspiracy were arrested, while 5 thousand people were executed, including 56 generals and one field marshal.

In September 1944, negotiations on a truce with the USSR and England, begun in March at the initiative of Finland, were completed. Under the terms of the signed agreement, the Soviet-Finnish border of 1940 was restored, in addition, Finland undertook to disarm the Nazi troops stationed on its territory.

Simultaneously with the Belarusian operation, offensive operations were carried out to liberate Ukraine, Moldova (Iasi-Chisinau) and the Baltic republics.

Germany was ready to do everything to keep the strategically important Baltic States, so the fighting on its territory continued from July to mid-October. Only on October 13, 1944, Soviet troops entered the capital of Latvia, Riga. In the deep autumn of 1944, the Red Army cleared the Murmansk region of invaders and liberated ice-free ports in the Barents Sea.

As a result of offensive operations in 1944, the entire territory of the USSR was liberated from fascist invaders. The state border of the USSR along its entire length was completely restored.

The period of a radical change (Radical change) is a radical change in forces during the Great Patriotic War, characterized by the transition of the initiative into the hands of the USSR and the Soviet army, as well as a sharp increase in the military-economic situation of the Soviet Union.

In the first period of the Great Patriotic War, the initiative belonged entirely to Hitler and Nazi Germany. Several factors contributed to this at once: firstly, Germany had a huge military and industrial power, thanks to which its army was more numerous and its military equipment more modern; secondly, the surprise factor greatly contributed to Hitler's success - although the attack on the USSR was not completely unexpected for the Soviet command, it nevertheless caught the Soviet army by surprise, because of which it could not carefully prepare and put up a worthy rebuff even on its own territories. Already in the first two years of the war, Hitler and the allies managed to capture Ukraine, Belarus, blockade Leningrad and come close to Moscow. The Soviet army during this period suffered one defeat after another.

However, Hitler's superiority could not last long, and the great battle of Stalingrad marked the beginning of a radical turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War.

• The strategic initiative passed from Germany to the USSR. The Germans lost their superiority in the war, the Red Army launched a counteroffensive, and Germany turned from an attacker into a defender, gradually retreating back to the borders;
• The rise of the economy and the military industry, the entire industry of the USSR, on the orders of Stalin, was aimed at meeting the needs of the front. This made it possible to completely re-equip the Soviet army in a short time, giving it an advantage over the enemy;
• Qualitative changes in the world arena were also achieved thanks to the counter-offensive of the Soviet Union that had begun.

The course of the radical fracture

In 1942, in the winter, the Soviet command made several attempts to seize the initiative and launch a counteroffensive, however, both the winter and spring offensives were unsuccessful - the Germans were still in full control of the situation, and the Soviet troops were losing more and more territories. In the same period, Germany received serious reinforcements, which only increased its power.

At the end of June 1942, the Germans began to advance in the south from Stalingrad, where protracted and very fierce battles for the city unfolded. Stalin, seeing the situation, issued the famous order "Not a step back", in which he said that the city should not be taken in any case. It was necessary to organize a defense, which the Soviet command did, transferring all its forces to Stalingrad. The battle for the city lasted several months, but the Germans failed to take Stalingrad, despite the huge losses on the part of the Soviet army.

A radical change began in the second period of the Battle of Stalingrad, along with Operation Uranus, according to which it was planned to unite several Soviet fronts and encircle the German army with their help, forcing it to capitulate, or simply destroy the enemy. The operation was led by Generals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky. On November 23, the Germans were completely surrounded, and by February 2 they were destroyed. The Battle of Stalingrad ended with a triumphant victory for the Soviet Union.

From that moment on, the strategic initiative passed to the USSR, new weapons and uniforms began to actively enter the front, which in a short time ensured technical superiority. In the winter-spring of 1943, the USSR strengthened its position by recapturing Leningrad and launching an offensive in the Caucasus and the Don.

The final turning point occurred along with the Battle of Kursk (July 5 - August 23, 1943). At the beginning of the year, the Germans managed to achieve some success in the southern direction, so the command decided to launch an offensive operation on the Kursk salient in order to seize the initiative again. On July 12, a major tank battle took place, which ended in the complete defeat of the German army. The Soviet Union was able to recapture Belgorod, Orel and Kharkov, as well as inflict heavy losses on Hitler's army.

The Battle of Kursk was the last stage of a radical turning point. From that moment until the end of the war, the initiative never again passed into the hands of Germany. The Soviet Union was able not only to win back its own territories, but also to reach Berlin.

Outcomes and significance of a radical fracture

It is difficult to overestimate the significance of the radical change for the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet Union was able to return its territories, free prisoners of war and forever seize the military initiative in its own hands, confidently destroying the enemy armies.

The transition of the initiative in the war to the USSR was also reflected in the course of the Second World War. After the defeat at Stalingrad in Germany, for the first time in the entire war, a three-day mourning was declared, which became a sign for the allied European troops, who were convinced that Hitler's hegemony could be overthrown, and he himself destroyed.

The proof that the turning point had taken place was the Tehran conference, which brought together in 1943 the heads of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain. The conference discussed the opening of a second European front, and a strategy to fight Hitler.

In fact, the period of a radical change was the beginning of the fall of the Hitler Empire.

Moscow 1941, Stalingrad 1942, Kursk 1943.
Moscow is a decisive stage, Stalingrad is a decisive one, Kursk is the final one in terms of a turning point. The radical turning point in the course of the Second World War began with the Battle of Stalingrad in 1942, which the Russian people heroically won
and was completed by the Battle of Kursk near the village of Prokhorovka in July 1943.

The concept of a radical turning point in a war includes such strategic and political changes in the course of hostilities as:

Transfer of strategic initiative from one belligerent to another;

Ensuring the reliable superiority of the defense industry and the rear economy as a whole;

Achieving military-technical superiority in supplying the army with the latest types of weapons;

Qualitative changes in the balance of forces in the international arena.

The decisive events of the Second World War, which provided a radical change in favor of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition, took place on the Soviet-German front. This means that the radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War was at the same time the turning point in the course of the Second World War.

The beginning of a radical change was laid by the offensive operation "Uranus" near Stalingrad (the second stage of the Battle of Stalingrad; the first - defensive - lasted from July 17 to November 18, 1942). The military-strategic plan of the operation, developed under the leadership of Generals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky, assumed the forces of three fronts - the South-Western, Stalingrad and Don - to surround the Stalingrad grouping of the enemy, create two reliable encirclement rings and either force him to capitulation, or defeat. On November 19, the Southwestern and Don Fronts went on the offensive, and on November 20, the Stalingrad Front. By November 23, the German 6th and 4th tank armies were surrounded. The enemy failed to break through the outer and inner ring by the forces of Army Group Don. On February 2, the Battle of Stalingrad ended victoriously; a total of 300 thousand German soldiers, officers and generals were taken prisoner.

All the signs of a fundamental change that had begun were evident: the strategic initiative passed to the Red Army, for the first time military-technical superiority over the enemy was ensured, achieved thanks to a qualitatively higher level of organization of the rear economy. The victory at Stalingrad was of great international importance: for the first time in the entire war, a three-day mourning was declared in Germany, and the European resistance movement became more active.

Winter - spring 1943. The Red Army developed success by breaking through the blockade of Leningrad, launching an offensive in the North Caucasus and in the upper reaches of the Don.

The final turning point in the course of the war was after the Battle of Kursk. The German command, having achieved some success in the summer of 1943 in the southwestern direction, planned a major offensive operation on the Kursk ledge (Operation Citadel). Special hopes were placed on the newest Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand assault guns.

For the first time, the Soviet command used the tactics of deliberate defense followed by an offensive: it created a powerful grouping of troops that outnumbered the enemy in quantitative and qualitative terms.

The Battle of Kursk lasted from July 5 to August 23. On July 12, the largest tank battle in the years of the war took place near the village of Prokhorovka, which ended in victory for our tankers. As a result of the battle, Belgorod, Orel, Kharkov were liberated, 500 thousand enemy soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, 3.7 thousand aircraft were destroyed. The radical change in the course of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War was completed. Since that time, the strategic initiative has not even temporarily passed into the hands of the German command.
1943 ended with the liberation of the Left-bank Ukraine, Donbass, Kyiv (November 6) during the battle for the Dnieper.

The radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War was accompanied by noticeable successes of the USSR allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. In the spring of 1943, the German-Italian grouping in North Africa capitulated, and in the summer the allies landed in Sicily. The government of B. Mussolini was overthrown, the new authorities announced their withdrawal from the war. Unfortunately, the second front in Europe in 1943 was never opened.

In a relatively short time, the fascist bloc suffered severe defeats on all major fronts. The Germans lost the superiority they had at the beginning of the war. It became more and more difficult for the Allies to abandon their previous commitments to open hostilities in Western Europe. The armed forces of the United States and England were prepared for the opening of a second front in the spring of 1943. Numerous statements by British and American military and political figures testified to this.

However, the Anglo-American allies did not make this attempt; moreover, they were not preparing to cross the English Channel and open a second front in 1943, despite numerous promises in this regard. Suffice it to say that the number of American troops in England from two and a half divisions in 1942 was reduced by May 1943 to one infantry division. Experienced British officers and soldiers were transferred to the Mediterranean theater of operations. If in September 1942 the number of American troops in Great Britain was 188 thousand soldiers and officers, then by the end of February 1943 it had decreased to 107,801. But the deception could not continue for a long time, and after another meeting in Washington in May 1943, F. Roosevelt informed I.V. Stalin about postponing the opening of the second front to 1944.

In addition to the problem of the second front, relations between the allies were complicated by the decision agreed between W. Churchill and F. Roosevelt to once again interrupt the supply of military materials to the northern seaports of the USSR under the pretext of the need to use vehicles in the Mediterranean, which was reported to the Soviet government on March 30, 1943.

History repeated itself: on the eve of the next summer offensive of the Wehrmacht, the allies announced the postponement of the opening of the second front, reduced and completely stopped the supply of military equipment to the USSR. So it was in 1942. The same thing happened in 1943. The conclusions were self-evident.

Beginning in August 1943, after the Battle of Kursk, the second front in Europe was of cardinal importance for the Soviet Union already in political terms. In the context of the opening of the second front, from the point of view of Moscow, it was not the fate of Germany that was being decided, but the configuration of the future world. At the same time, the desire to share with the USSR the fruits of the victory over Nazi Germany, a victory to which the Red Army made a decisive contribution, became a profiling argument for Roosevelt and Churchill.

The events that took place during the summer and autumn of 1943 on the Soviet-German front dramatically changed the entire military-political situation. It became obvious that the Soviet Union was capable of independently freeing the peoples of Europe from the fascist yoke. In this situation, the state and military leaders of the Western allies, fearing that the Soviet armies would enter Central and Western Europe ahead of their troops, were forced to recognize the need for an invasion of France across the English Channel.

In October 1943, a conference of foreign ministers of the three powers was held in Moscow, at which the Western Allies informed the Soviet side about plans to open a second front and land the Allies in Northern France in May 1944.

Tehran Conference and the opening of a second front.

During the four days of the Tehran Conference - from November 28 to December 1, 1943 - the heads of the governments of the USSR, the USA and England exchanged views on the most important issues of war and peace. The main issue of the conference was the opening of a second front.

As is known from various sources, the date set at the Tehran Conference for the operation codenamed "Overlord" - May 31, 1944 - was nevertheless violated. The landing of the Anglo-American troops on the French coast took place only in June 1944. Nevertheless, the duality of the general approach to the Soviet ally led to the duality of both the concept and operational plans in the implementation of decisions to open a second front. In fact, there were two scenarios - "Overlord" in case of assistance by the Wehrmacht. In August - September of the same 1944, following Operation Overlord, the Allies carried out a second amphibious landing operation - a landing in southern France (Operation "Envil", from July 27, 1944.- "Dragoon. The creation of a foothold in the South of France made it possible to deploy here a new 6th group of allied armies as part of the seventh American and first French armies in September 1944 to form a united front in France with two allied army groups advancing from Normandy (the 12th American and 21 so, the opening of the second front in Western Europe dragged on for three years (counting from the moment this idea was put forward).

The Tehran conference became necessary to discuss a number of military issues, as well as the post-war world order. At it, finally, the final decision was made to open a second front. At this time, the USSR no longer needed to open it as much as in 1941 or 1942, now the country could cope with Hitler on its own. The Allies, on the other hand, were afraid of the possibility of the liberation of Europe by the Soviet Union, so they were in a hurry to open a second front.